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Abstract
It has been demonstrated that deep neural net-
works are prone to noisy examples particular
adversarial samples during inference process.
The gap between robust deep learning systems
in real world applications and vulnerable neu-
ral networks is still large. Current adversar-
ial training strategies improve the robustness
against adversarial samples. However, these
methods lead to accuracy reduction when the
input examples are clean thus hinders the prac-
ticability. In this paper, we investigate an ap-
proach that protects the neural network classi-
fication from the adversarial samples and im-
proves its accuracy when the input examples
are clean. We demonstrate the versatility and
effectiveness of our proposed approach on a
variety of different networks and datasets.
1 Introduction
Many high-performance deep learning applications in
computer vision, speech recognition and other areas are
susceptible to minimal changes of the inputs He et al.
[2018]. Therefore, a robust system is required for the
real-world applications when the input is affected by
many interferences and noise.
Current robust learning strategies in the context of neu-
ral network classification only play against adversarial
samples, while the accuracy reduces when the samples
are clean. In this paper, we stand on the perspective
of robust optimization and propose an approach to im-
prove the performance of the networks on both clean and
noise data. In particular, we propose a counterpart of the
FSGM algorithm (Goodfellow et al. [2014]), which in-
herits the sign function for the robustness against permu-
tation and helps the neural network leaves saddle points
during the training process.
2 Related Work
Adversarial training strategies are proposed for both at-
tacks and defenses inspired by robust optimization. For
example, a training procedure is provided that model
parameters updates are augmented with the worst-case
perturbations of the training data Sinha et al. [2017].
A mixed strategy named stochastic activation pruning
(SAP) is applied on the training of deep neural networks
for the robustness against adversarial examples in He et
al. [2018]. A potential application of local intrinsic di-
mensionality is studied to distinguish adversarial exam-
ples Ma et al. [2018]. These adversarial training strate-
gies are presented with better performance when the in-
put examples are noisy. However, the above algorithms
do not perform well when the input samples are free from
noise. In the following, we introduce an algorithm that
is capable to improve the performance without any as-
sumption on the data quality.
3 Methodology
In a standard deep learning task, we let f denote the com-
plex non-linear function of the deep neural network and
θ denote the parameters of f . Let x and y be the in-
put and output sample of the network. y = f(x) de-
notes the standard function of a deep learning task. We
use sgn to denote the sign function and use δ(x) to de-
fine the dirac delta function. We use D to represent the
data distribution over pairs of examples x ∈ Rd1 and la-
bels y ∈ Rd2 . Denote L(θ, x, y) as the loss function,
and the goal is to find model parameters θ that minimize
the risk E(x,y)[L(θ, x, y)]. This empirical risk minimiza-
tion (ERM) is successful for finding classifiers with small
population task. However, it is not robust enough against
some common disturbances. In particular, the model in-
correctly classifies xˆ as belonging to a different class of
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x if xˆ is very close to xˆ.
In order to impose robustness, the population risk ED [L]
is formulated as the following
ρ(θ) = E(x,y)∼D
[
max
δ∈S
L(θ, x+ δ, y)
]
. (1)
The objective is to minimize the above population risk
min ρ(θ).
We next define g(x) to be the function which pro-
duces adversarial samples from clean samples. That is,
xˆ = g(x). The population risk ED [L] is represented
as ρ(θ) = E(x,y)∼D [maxδ∈S L(θ, g(x), y)]. The cor-
responding function is denoted as y = f(g(x)). In the
following, we first propose an algorithm, and analyzed
the Jacobian of the deep neural network when the algo-
rithm is applied. We further analyze the Hessian. Based
on the analysis, we could safely say that the proposed al-
gorithm dose not introduce extra saddle points and may
be very likely help the neural network leave saddle points
on a sharper direction of the loss function surface.
3.1 Analysis of Jacobian
We propose the following algorithm:
g(x) = x+ xsgn(x).
We have
∂g(x)
∂x
= 1 + (sgn(x) + xδ′),
∂2g(x)
∂x2
= (δ(x) + δ(x) + xδ′(x))
= (δ(x) + δ(x)− δ(x))
= δ(x)
Firstly, the Jacobian is given as following.
J(θ) =
∂f(g(x))
∂x
=
∂f(x)
∂x
(1 + (sgn(x) + xδ′))
=
∂f(x)
∂x
(1 + sgn(x))
If  is smaller than 1, no extra extreme points will be
introduced. The extreme points are all from ∂f(x)∂x = 0.
3.2 Analysis of Hessian
The Hessian is given as following.
H(θ) =
∂2f(g(x))
∂x2
=
∂2f(x)
∂x2
∂g(x)
∂x
∂g(x)
∂x
+
∂f(x)
∂x
∂2g(x)
∂x2
=
∂2f(x)
∂x2
(1 + (sgn(x) + xδ(x)))2 +
∂f(x)
∂x
(δ(x))
For any extreme points such that ∂f(x)∂x = 0, the Hessian
equation is given by
H(θ) =
∂2f(x)
∂x2
(1 + 2sgn(x)sgn(x)).
It could be observed that the change rate of the Jacobian
is increased as 1 + 2sgn(x)sgn(x) ≥ 1. This implies
a higher rate of change which helps the neural networks
leave saddle points during the training process.
3.3 Implementation
The proposed g(x) could be applied in the input space
and the hidden space of the deep neural networks. That
is, x could be samples of the input and the vectors in the
hidden space of the deep neural networks.
In order to apply the adversarial training strategy on-line
without extra computational burden, the proposed algo-
rithm dose not rely on the calculation of gradients like
FGSM (Goodfellow et al. [2014]). Instead, the perturba-
tion item is calculated feed-forward once the samples in
the input/hidden space are calculated.
Let x denote the samples in the input/hidden space. In
the following experiments, g(x) has the form
g(x) = x+ x l(x).
Here {
l(x) = sgn(x) w.p. p,
l(x) = −sgn(x) w.p. 1− p.
4 Numerical experiments
We evaluate the proposed form of robust algorithm g(x)
where p = 0.5. The evaluation is made on a vari-
ety of popular datasets, including small-scale, middle-
scale and large-scale datasets (MNIST LeCun et al.
[1998], CIFAR10, CIFAR100 Krizhevsky and Hinton
[2009], SVHN Netzer et al. [2011] and Imagenet-1k
Russakovsky et al. [2015]). Extensive experimental eval-
uations are presented in two aspects including perfor-
mance improvement for the clean samples in input space
Figure 1: Five common attacks.
Table 1: Top-1 classification accuracy on ImageNet-1k for five different disturbances in the input space.
Model Ran-Crop Ran-Hlip Ran-GrayScale(%) Ran-Color(%) Random Five Crop(%)
Imagenet
FGSM-CondenseNet(G=C=8) 68.27 69.42 68.03 69.21 58.17
CondenseNet(G=C=8) 70.04± 0.05 71.00± 0.03 69.79± 0.04 71.05± 0.04 60.03± 0.05
R-CondenseNet(G=C=8) 70.38± 0.03 71.29± 0.05 70.06± 0.03 71.25± 0.02 60.45± 0.04
FGSM-CondenseNet(G=C=4) 70.34 71.48 70.72 71.39 60.04
CondenseNet(G=C=4) 72.92± 0.02 73.78± 0.05 72.74± 0.03 73.76± 0.03 62.52± 0.04
R-CondenseNet(G=C=4) 73.34± 0.03 74.12± 0.02 73.05± 0.05 74.07± 0.06 63.26± 0.04
Table 2: Top-1 and Top-5 classification accuracies of state-of-art regular models on ImageNet-1k.
Model Image Size Params Mul-Adds Tops-1(%) Tops-5(%)
Imagenet
SENet 320× 320 145.8M 42.4B 82.7 96.2
NASNet-A 331× 331 88.9M 23.8B 82.7 96.2
FGSM-NASNet-A 331× 331 88.9M 23.8B 80.6 92.1
R-NASNet-A 331× 331 88.9M 23.8B 83.0± 0.03 96.5± 0.05
Table 3: Top-1 and Top-5 classification error rate of state-of-art compact models on ImageNet-1k.
Model FLOPs Params Tops-1(%) Tops-5(%)
Imagenet
Inception V1 1,448M 6.6M 30.2 10.1
1.0 MobileNet-224 569M 4.2M 29.4 10.5
ShffleNet 2x 524M 5.3M 29.1 10.5
NASNet-B(N=4) 488M 5.3M 27.2 9.0
NASNet-C(N=3) 558M 4.9M 27.5 9.0
CondenseNet(G=C=8) 274M 2.9M 29.0 10.0
CondenseNet(G=C=4) 274M 2.9M 26.2 8.3
FGSM-CondenseNet(G=C=8) 274M 2.9M 30.8 12.3
FGSM-CondenseNet(G=C=4) 529M 4.8M 27.9 10.7
R-CondenseNet(G=C=8) 274M 2.9M 28.6± 0.05 9.9± 0.06
R-CondenseNet(G=C=4) 529M 4.8M 25.8± 0.04 8.1± 0.05
and the noisy samples in input space (see Figure 1). We
evaluate the FGSM for base models and the proposed
algorithm for based models, called R-base models. As
shown in Table 1, the accuracy is improved when the in-
Table 4: Middle-scaled supervised classification: MNIST and SVHN.
Model Depth Factor Dropout Standard Aug Random Erase Error(%)
MNIST
LeNetLeCun et al. [1998] - -
√
- - 0.50
FGSM-LeNet - -
√
- - 0.60
R-LeNet - -
√
- - 0.28
CapsNetSabour et al. [2017] - -
√
- - 0.35
FGSM-CapsNet - -
√
- - 0.51
R-CapsNet - -
√
- - 0.30
SVHN
S-ResNet Huang et al. [2016] 110 -
√ √
- 1.75
FGSM-S-ResNet 110 -
√ √
- 1.90
R-S-ResNet 110 -
√ √
- 1.70
W-ResNet Zagoruyko and Komodakis [2016] 16 k = 8
√ √
- 1.54
FGSM-S-Resnet 16 k = 8
√ √
- 1.71
R-W-ResNet 16 k = 8
√ √
- 1.49
Table 5: Middle-scaled supervised classification: CIFAR10 and CIFAR100.
Model Depth Factor Dropout Standard Aug Random Erase Error(%)
CIFAR10
W-ResNet Zagoruyko and Komodakis [2016] 28 k = 10
√ √ √
3.1
FGSM-W-ResNet 28 k = 10
√ √ √
4.2
R-W-ResNet 28 k = 10
√ √ √
2.7
CIFAR100
InceptionV3 Szegedy et al. [2015] 48 -
√ √
- 22.69
FGSM-InceptionV3 48 -
√ √
- 23.41
R-InceptionV3 48 -
√ √
- 21.80
W-ResNet Zagoruyko and Komodakis [2016] 28 k = 10
√ √ √
17.73
FGSM-W-ResNet 28 k = 10
√ √ √
18.61
R-W-ResNet 28 k = 10
√ √ √
17.18
puts are noisy compared with base models and FGSM
for base models. As shown in Table 2 to Table 5, the
accuracy is improved when the inputs are clean.
5 Discussion
We propose an approach that help neural networks
achieve both robustness against noisy inputs and higher
accuracy for clean input. It enhances the practicality of
neural networks such that the input can be clean or noisy.
This is an initial work that only five common types of
noise are evaluated. In the real world, the types of noise
are unknown and it remains unclear whether the inputs is
attacked by the disturbance or not. In addition, the base
model is also a black box that the gradients are hard to
obtain. A systematic way of overcoming these problems
deserve one’s attention.
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